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 1 
Commercial Boycotting and Conscientious Breach of Contract 
(Co-authored with Prince Saprai) 




In this article we argue that commercial boycotting is not an uncontested economic right. 
Rather, the practice of boycotting often requires further moral justification. We argue that 
this justification should not rely solely on the consequences of boycotting, nor should it 
rely solely on the complicity of the consumer. We suggest that both justifications are 
subject to pressing objections. In light of these objections, we outline an alternative non-
consequentialist justification of commercial boycotting that is grounded in the moral 
values of conscience and personal integrity. We then explore the scope of this justification 
in the legal realm. We focus on cases where consumers lack freedom of exchange due to 
their contractual obligations and conclude by defending a qualified legal right to breach 
contracts on conscientious grounds. 
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Introduction 
Boycotts are a way of expressing disapproval about the practices of certain institutional, 
political, or corporate actors. The focus of our paper is on a particular and very common 
type of boycott, which we shall call the ‘market’ or ‘commercial’ boycott. These boycotts 
standardly take the form of the withdrawal of trade from consumer to firm, or from 
supplier to producer. Market actors boycott a firm by intentionally not transacting with 
it because they object to the firm’s practices (e.g. exploitative contracts, unsafe working 
conditions, unfair executive rewards, environmental negligence, etc.).1 This practice 
offers consumers and suppliers an important avenue of social activism that can shape the 
behaviour of firms.  
Market boycotting expresses one market actor’s dislike of the target actor’s behaviour by 
changing the target’s incentive structure in order to make their objectionable behaviour 
less profitable. As firms have a basic incentive to seek profits and avoid losses, boycotters 
use their market power to alter the firm’s revenue in order to change the firm’s 
                                                 
1 Monroe Friedman, ‘Consumer Boycotts: A Conceptual Framework and Research Agenda’, Journal of Social 
Issues 47, 1 (1991): 149-168, at p. 151.  
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behaviour. When boycotts proceed in a visible and public manner, they also communicate 
this dislike to firm directors and shareholders, draw fellow consumers’ attention to 
objectionable practices, and create a significant source of shame that may encourage 
firms to change their behaviour. In sum, market boycotts aim to hurt the profits and 
reputations of firms that behave objectionably.2 
There are many prominent examples of market boycotts: For example, many 
Liverpudlians continue to boycott The Sun newspaper after its reporting of the 1989 
Hillsborough disaster. Some consumers boycott Nestlé because they object that 
marketing breast milk substitutes in poor countries puts the health of newborns at risk. 
Some consumers boycott factory farmed eggs due to the cruelty involved in the process 
of farming them, and so on. 
The potentially significant market-altering effects of boycotting raise questions about its 
permissibility. Prima facie, it is unclear that market boycotts are objectionable. It is a 
central tenet of a liberal market economy that market actors enjoy both freedom of 
contract and its flipside freedom from contract.3 If it is permissible not to buy products 
and services for everyday reasons, like price, brand image, or aesthetic preference, then 
mutatis mutandis, boycotting should also be permitted. Boycotting is merely the 
intentional principled form of this everyday fact of market interaction and is permissible 
due to this similarity.  
This orthodox assumption regarding the permissibility of boycotting informs the view 
that consumers are at liberty to boycott firms who behave in ways that they do not agree 
with. On the face of it, this looks like a powerful argument. However, we should 
distinguish between two types of objection to it: 
First, sceptics of the orthodox permissibility of boycotting may raise generic objections to 
the practice. Generic objections track the general features of the practice. For example, 
we might object to boycotting on political grounds. Although boycotting takes an 
economic form, it also has social and political effects. Our private consumption choices 
have public outcomes when they harm other moral agents, non-human animals, and the 
environment.4 When individual consumers choose to purchase particular goods and 
services over others, they exert market power which rewards the producers of these 
goods and services. The resulting aggregate patterns of consumption do much to 
                                                 
2 Boycotting differs in this aim from its positive alternative, so-called ‘Buycotting’. Monroe Friedman, 
Consumer Boycotts: Effecting Change Through the Marketplace and the Media (New York: Routledge, 1999), 
pp. 201-212; Lisa A. Nielson, ‘Boycott or Buycott? Understanding Political Consumerism’, Journal of 
Consumer Behaviour 9, 3 (2010): 214-227; Lauren Copeland, ‘Conceptualising Political Consumerism: How 
Citizenship Norms Differentiate Boycotting from Buycotting’, Political Studies 62, 1 sup. (2014): 172-186. 
3 Dori Kimel, From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal Theory of Contract (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2003), ch. 5.  
4 For a defence of this causal claim and taxonomy of the resulting harms, see David T. Schwartz, 
Consuming Choices: Ethics in a Global Consumer Age (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), pp. 21-67. 
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determine the material standard of living in capitalist societies. These effects ensure that 
consumers participate in the market as a mechanism of both economic and social change 
that distributes both resources and opportunities.  
Boycotting, then, is an economic method of effecting social and political change. 
Furthermore, the market is an unequal place. Some market actors enjoy resources and 
opportunities at the expense of others and wealthy citizens have significantly more 
purchasing power than poorer citizens. When market outcomes affect social and political 
change, and these outcomes are inegalitarian, then market behaviour offers some citizens 
a greater chance to affect that change than others. Critics may therefore suggest that the 
permeable relationship between market economics and liberal politics guarantees that 
market power can be intentionally used to apply undue pressure on the democratic 
political process. Seen in this light, boycotts are a method by which organised pressure 
groups and wealthy elites can exert additional power over political decision-making and 
social outcomes. As this additional influence is not open to all citizens, it threatens to 
undermine political equality by making some voices in society objectionably louder than 
others. 5  
Boycotts across national borders raise additional transnational concerns over domestic 
sovereignty and national self-governance as wealthy global market actors impose 
significant pressures to shape foreign social and political conditions through global trade. 
Finally, critics might generically object to boycotting as an extra-legal means of achieving 
justice. For instance, we might worry that individual consumer acts may aggregate to 
punish firms disproportionately to their wrongdoing.6 We might also worry about the 
procedural fairness of boycotting by questioning the burden of proof and relevant 
standards of evidence that motivate boycotters to act.7 
                                                 
5 Insofar as our opportunities for social and political change should be egalitarian and democratic, 
boycotting is objectionable because it threatens to distort our equal access to these opportunities. For 
example, boycotting contravenes the participatory benefits that Ronald Dworkin attributes to political 
equality by distorting the rough ‘Equality of Impact’ that democratic decision-making requires for its 
legitimacy. These benefits include the symbolic recognition, moral agency, and sense of community that 
citizens enjoy when they participate in an egalitarian democratic process. These goods do not require 
citizens to possess equal amounts of political influence, but they do require that the votes of individual 
citizens have a roughly equal impact on political outcomes. Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory 
and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 187. Boycotting also 
threatens what John Rawls names the ‘Fair Value of Equal Political Liberties’ because it is one manner by 
which wealthy citizens may use their wealth to entrench greater opportunities to enjoy their basic 
liberties and to deprive other citizens of theirs. John Rawls. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Harvard: 
Belknap Press, 2001), pp. 148-50. For more on the deprivation problem, see Waheed Hussain, ‘Is Ethical 
Consumerism an Impermissible Form of Vigilantism?’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 40, 2 (2012): 111-143, 
at pp. 117-118. 
6 Linda Radzik, ‘Boycotts and the Social Enforcement of Justice’, Social Philosophy and Policy 34, 1 (2017): 
102-122, at pp. 116-7. 
7 Ibid., p. 120. 
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We aim to leave these generic objections to the orthodox permissibility of boycotting to 
one side.8 We neither deny their importance, nor believe that they are insurmountable. 
Rather, we seek to study a different type of objection to boycotting that is often obscured 
by generic objections to the practice. Specific objections differ from their generic siblings 
because they arise from particular circumstances of exchange, rather than from the 
general features of the practice of boycotting. Simply put, specific objections to boycotting 
are contextual rather than universal.  
The circumstances that we are interested in concern the permissibility of boycotting 
where market actors lack the legal freedoms of contract or from contract that the 
orthodox view assumes. In such circumstances, the orthodox permissibility of boycotting 
does not hold. Crucially, however, the reason it does not hold is not because the value of 
political equality, national sovereignty, or procedural justice defeats our permission to 
boycott. Instead, the orthodox permissibility fails to hold due to the presence of prior held 
moral and legal obligations. In such cases, our permission to boycott conflicts with a 
different set of circumstantial considerations. It is for this reason that the arguments 
required to justify boycotting in such cases differ from those required to justify 
boycotting under the orthodox assumption. 
The example we will focus on is where boycotting takes place in the context of pre-
existing contractual obligations. A consumer or supplier discovers, after having entered 
into a contract with a firm, that that firm engages in morally objectionable behaviour (e.g. 
by using tax havens to avoid local taxes, using sweatshops in poor countries, polluting the 
environment, and so on), and as a result the consumer or supplier refuse to perform their 
side of the contract. This sort of case raises interesting moral and legal issues, and large 
practical and commercial consequences flow from the manner in which these issues are 
handled and dealt with.    
In what follows, we argue that parties have permission to boycott in these breach of 
contract cases, subject to certain conditions. We suggest that, due to their causal 
requirement, consequentialist justifications of this permission are poorly suited to the 
task. On this view, our permission to boycott is contingent on how effectively it serves the 
goal of bringing a firm’s morally objectionable practices to an end. We believe that the 
permission has a wider scope than this because individual breaches rarely cause a firm 
to change its objectionable ways and because we believe that further non-causal factors 
should play a part in grounding the permission. Therefore, we defend a right to boycott 
grounded in the conscience and moral integrity of consumers. This justification permits 
so-called ‘symbolic boycotts’ - where the boycotter is unlikely to succeed in changing the 
firm’s behaviour. We then explore the legality of the permission granted by this deontic 
justification. We characterise the permitted acts as a conscientious form of breach of 
contract and argue that legal permission to breach should be granted according to the 
                                                 
8 For discussion of this sort of objection, see Claudia Mills, ‘Should we Boycott Boycotts?’, Journal of Social 
Philosophy 27, 3 (1996): 136-48; Monroe Friedman, ‘Ethical Dilemmas Associated with Consumer 
Boycotts’, Journal of Social Philosophy 32, 2 (2001): 232-40; Hussain op. cit.; Radzik op. cit. 
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moral permission to boycott grounded in the value of moral integrity. We conclude by 
discussing and rejecting legal objections to our argument. 
  
Why Not Consequentialism?  
In our view, the justification for a right to boycott in the breach of contract context is best 
justified on non-consequentialist grounds. This is because consequentialist justifications 
are too restrictive along a number of important dimensions. According to the 
consequentialist view, a right to boycott will depend on how likely it is that the boycott 
will change the firm’s objectionable business practices. Let’s call this the Effectiveness 
Condition. As we show in this section, this condition is the source of a number of problems 
for those seeking to justify boycotting and rules out so-called symbolic boycotts. Here, we 
focus on four problems – the Hostage Objection, the Warrant Objection, the 
Phenomenology Objection, and the Complicity Objection. 
First, consider the difficulty that boycotters face in meeting the effectiveness condition. 
They meet this condition by creating a large enough market incentive to successfully 
motivate firms into changing their behaviour. Boycotts are effective when they generate 
market power that is greater than the firm’s commitment to its objectionable practices. 
It is only when the pressure that the boycotters impose on the firm is weightier than this 
commitment that a boycott will succeed in motivating the firm to change its ways. In some 
cases, this will only require a single consumer (e.g. where a consumer purchases a lot of 
produce or service from a small firm). However, commonly this will tend to require a 
coordinated collective act in order to exert significant pressure through a firm’s 
incentives.  
The effectiveness condition is difficult to fulfil because boycotters only wield their own 
market power. Boycotters cannot control the behaviour of the other consumers that 
contribute to the firm’s incentives. Specifically, they cannot prevent other market actors 
from continuing to consume the firm’s products or perform their contracts with the firm, 
and they cannot prevent new actors from entering the market to replace their absence by 
providing new business to the firm.  
Boycotts are not like blockades. All that boycotters can do is to withhold their own trade 
or performance of contracts and inform other consumers about objectionable business 
practices in order to spur their consciences into action. Hence, although boycotters can 
control whether or not they buy a firm’s products, or breach a contract they have already 
entered, they cannot control the extent to which the loss of their trade matters to the firm 
because they cannot prevent the actions of other consumers from negating the effects of 
their actions on the firm’s incentive structure.9  
                                                 
9 Indeed, some boycotts backfire by creating further harms (e.g., redundancies). These boycotts cannot 
exert a large enough pressure on the firm to incentivise it to change its objectionable working practices 
because the workers who lose their jobs in response to the fall in trade are less important to the firm’s 
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These difficulties mean that an individual consumer can never be sure that their 
consumption choices will contribute pressure to a firm’s incentive structure, or that their 
contribution (if they make one) will make a significant difference to the firm’s behaviour. 
This does not prevent consequentialism from justifying some boycotts as collective 
actions in the abstract.10 However, in light of the effectiveness condition, these difficulties 
do restrict the permission that consequentialism can justify. Consumers are not 
necessarily permitted to boycott any firm that they find objectionable, nor are they 
necessarily permitted to boycott firms who commit the greatest wrongs. Rather, 
consumers are permitted to boycott firms whose wrongful behaviour their boycott is 
likely to curb. The more likely a boycott is to succeed and the more wrongs that are likely 
to be righted, the more permissible it is to join a collective effort to boycott a firm.  
This outcome-orientated approach has some benefits in judging where a consumer’s 
limited efforts will make the most efficient causal contribution to fighting injustice. 
However, we worry that it holds each individual’s permission to boycott hostage to the 
actions of the rest of the group of likely boycotters. When permissibility requires 
effectiveness, and effectiveness requires coordination, individual actors are in a morally 
relevant sense unfree. Let’s call this the Hostage Objection. 
Second, consider what information consumers need to know in order to judge the 
permissibility of their actions.  Due to the effectiveness condition, consumers need to 
know that their boycott is likely to succeed in order to know whether their boycott is 
warranted.  
Boycotters face serious epistemic hurdles in estimating the effectiveness, and thus the 
permissibility, of their intended actions. To know whether their boycott will be effective, 
a boycotter must be able to estimate and compare the market power of a coordinated 
boycott and the firm’s commitment to its objectionable practices. Both tasks are 
extremely difficult and go far beyond the expected due diligence of consumers. The 
former requires consumers to have reasonably accurate knowledge of the market power 
                                                 
bottom line than its objectionable working practices. The firm’s response to the boycott reflects this 
priority.  
10 For example, consequentialists can adopt Shelly Kagan’s proposed solution to solving ‘collective trigger’ 
cases according to the discounted expected utility of each individual’s contribution to crossing the 
threshold required for permissibility. Kagan argues that, under conditions of uncertainty, 
consequentialism gives us reasons to do what will have the best expected outcomes. If we know that an 
effective boycott will bring about beneficial results, then even if it is very unlikely that one consumer’s 
individual consumption choice is the choice that transforms an ineffective boycott into an effective 
boycott, we can discount the overall beneficial results for the low likelihood that the individual 
consumer’s choice made the difference. The net result of this calculation must remain positive (if 
somewhat diminished) due to the boycott’s overall beneficial consequences. This positive result then 
guarantees that the consumer’s participation in the boycott has a positive expected utility, leading 
consequentialism to give the consumer a moral permission to boycott. Shelly Kagan, ‘Do I Make a 
Difference?’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 39, 2 (2011): 105-141, at pp. 119-120. For further discussion, 
see Schwartz op. cit., ch. 3. 
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of every likely participant in the collective action. The latter requires consumers to know 
corporate information that they are not privy to, foresee a range of factors (including 
circumstantial factors) that are relevant to the firm’s future behaviour, and accurately 
predict the firm’s likely response to the various pressures of the boycott.  
These difficulties mean that even boycotters who are able to coordinate an effective 
boycott may not know whether their collective actions are permissible. Hence, the 
complexity of effective boycotting makes the epistemic warrant of permissibility difficult 
to establish, given the consumer’s inevitably limited grasp of the facts on the ground. Let’s 
call this the Warrant Objection. 
The warrant objection compounds the hostage objection; making it very difficult to justify 
boycotting on consequentialist grounds. Due to the epistemic hurdles that market actors 
face when establishing warranted permissibility, morally permissible boycotts may be 
frustrated and morally impermissible boycotts may be encouraged because consumers 
struggle to know whether their intended boycotts are more likely to succeed or fail. 11 
Thus, not only does a consequentialist permission to boycott require a type of causal 
contribution that consumers rarely make, it also requires evidence that consumers rarely 
know.  
Third, the hostage and warrant objections follow from the effectiveness condition. 
Boycotts that avoid these objections are likely to be very large and extremely well 
publicised. Few real-world boycotts satisfy these conditions, and fewer (if any) breach of 
contract cases do so. This is why we reach beyond the consequentialist justification of 
permissible boycotting. In our view, the effectiveness condition is too restrictive and 
allows for too few permissible boycotts. Moreover, we believe that it should be possible 
to justify boycotting in at least some symbolic cases where the boycott seems highly 
unlikely to succeed in making the firm change its objectionable practices. We believe that 
a significant number of breach cases take this form.  
The consequentialist may reject this intuition about the justifiability of symbolic 
boycotting as it conflicts with the effectiveness condition. We hold onto it though, because 
it reflects the moral experience of many people who engage in boycotting; they believe 
that their boycotts are justified whether or not they succeed in making firms change their 
morally objectionable behaviour. This belief is an important part of the phenomenology 
of the moral practice that consequentialism fails to capture. Let’s call this the 
Phenomenology Objection.12  
                                                 
11 This fact causes a significant problem for those seeking to apply Kagan’s methodology to boycotting. In 
order to justify a boycott by appeal to the discounted expected utility produced by joining, we must first 
know that the discounted expected utility of joining is positive, and we must overcome the warrant 
objection in order to know whether this is the case. 
12 To illustrate this aspect of the practice of boycotting, consider the recent case of the journalist Steve 
Bloomfield who is boycotting his football club, Aston Villa, on account of its recruitment of a football player, 
John Terry, known to have used racist language. Bloomfield justifies taking this stand on grounds of 
principle, even though he is well aware his boycott is unlikely to be effective: “The only thing I can do is 
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It is, of course, open to the consequentialist to offer a revisionary account of justified 
boycotting that repudiates this aspect of the practice and seeks to answer the hostage and 
warrant objections. However, we want to explore what sorts of reasons might justify this 
aspect of the practice. Once identified, we argue these reasons bring to light a rival – 
potentially more plausible – conception of the practice.  
We don’t deny that many people engage in boycotting because they see some prospect of 
success in making the firm change its objectionable practices. Boycotters can and should 
aim to make a difference. However, it seems equally difficult to deny the moral salience 
of symbolic cases, where the boycott seems motivated by a desire to avoid association 
with or to actively disassociate oneself from the firm and its objectionable practices. 
Causal effectiveness is not the only reason that motivates boycotters. In our view, 
symbolic cases are an effort by the consumer to uphold an aspect of their moral integrity.  
The appeal of the value of moral integrity has of course famously troubled 
consequentialists in the past.13 To close this section, let’s consider the distinct version of 
this traditional problem that the hostage objection raises. The fact that consequentialism 
makes each individual’s permission to boycott rest in the hands of their fellow consumers 
threatens the moral integrity of the consumer by risking making them complicit in the 
firm’s moral wrongdoing. While the individual causal contribution that consumers make 
to boycotts is rarely sufficient for establishing permissibility on consequentialist grounds, 
it is often sufficient to ensure complicity in wrongdoing.  
Following Christopher Kutz, we understand complicity as a phenomenon that relies on 
collective, rather than individual, causal contributions.14 Consumers are not complicit in 
the wrongdoing of a firm to the extent that they individually causally contribute to that 
wrongdoing (as consequentialism requires). Rather, a consumer’s complicity involves a 
thinner collective form of causal contribution to the general class of ‘consumer’. In the 
absence of consumers, there would be no firm because without demand there is no need 
                                                 
withdraw my support. I’m not naive enough to believe a boycott will make a difference. But I can’t tell my 
friends “this is my team” and I can’t tell my son “this is your team” if John Terry wears claret and blue. As 
long as John Terry is a Villan, I’m not”. Bloomfield’s boycott seems justified, but this cannot be on 




13 Consequentialism is insensitive to the integrity of moral agents because it requires agents to treat the 
moral significance of their own personal commitments and judgements as dependent on their weight in an 
impersonal ranking of states of affairs. Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical 
Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993), pp. 41-56. 
14 Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), p. 122. See also, Christopher Kutz, ‘Causeless Complicity’, Criminal Law and Philosophy 1, 3 
(2007): 289-305. 
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for supply. This form of contribution is sufficient to implicate the consumer in the firm’s 
wrongdoing without having to prove that the consumer is directly responsible for that 
wrongdoing, nor that they could prevent that wrongdoing by changing their purchasing 
behaviour.15 By purchasing the firm’s products, consumers (as a general class) contribute 
to the continued existence of a firm that acts objectionably. Further, by intentionally 
benefiting from the firm’s products, the consumer threatens her conscience and moral 
integrity because the benefit that she derives from her consumption is morally tainted by 
the firm’s malpractice.16 
This explains how consequentialist justifications of boycotting can render consumers 
complicit in corporate wrongdoing. The consequentialist account of permissibility 
requires a consumer’s boycott to make an individual causal difference to the firm’s 
wrongdoing. When this doesn’t happen, individual consumers lack an outcome-based 
moral reason to boycott wrongdoing firms because their solitary boycott fails to 
constrain the firm’s wrongful behaviour. The consumer’s actions remain merely 
symbolic. By withholding this reason from consumers, consequentialism threatens to 
render them complicit in a firm’s wrongdoing. Although the consumer knows that the 
firm acts wrongfully, they may also know that their boycott is unlikely to cause the firm 
to change its wrongful behaviour.17 Thus, although consequentialism might take into 
account the negative feelings of the consumer towards the firm’s practices, it cannot grant 
them an all things considered moral permission to symbolically boycott the firm (due to 
the effectiveness condition). This lack of a permission renders the consumer complicit in 
the firm’s wrongdoing. Let’s call this the Complicity Objection. 
 
Towards a Deontological Justification of Boycotting  
In the previous section we argued against causal effectiveness as a necessary condition 
of permissibility for boycotting. We suggested that this requirement was the source of a 
number of significant objections. In this section, we outline an alternative non-
consequentialist justification of boycotting. The basis of this justification stems from the 
same values that are ultimately threatened by the consequentialist justification outlined 
above – the conscience and moral integrity of consumers.  
To some non-consequentialists, this justification may be surprising.18 After all, complicity 
in wrongdoing may be sufficient to ground a moral permission to boycott a firm without 
                                                 
15 Bashshar Haydar & Gerhard Øverland, ‘The Normative Implications of Benefitting from Injustice’, 
Journal of Applied Philosophy 31, 4 (2014): 349-62, at pp. 356-60. 
16 Schwartz op. cit., ch. 4. For further discussion of these types of case and the duties that follow, see Avia 
Pasternak, ‘Voluntary Benefits from Wrongdoing’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 31, 4 (2014): 377-91.  
17 The Bloomfield case (n. 12) is a clear example of this phenomenon. 
18 Thank you to Adam Slavny and Victor Tadros for this suggestion. 
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appeal to any further values. We might think that wrong-doing firms lack both the right 
to act wrongly and the right to make consumers complicit in their wrongdoing. If these 
firms do not cease their wrongful behaviour, then consumers should be permitted to 
boycott these firms in order to avoid complicity.  
In the context of breach of contract, this view would suggest that the consumer as 
promisor has no right to promise to perform an act that would make her complicit in 
wrongdoing. In the same way that some claim that we have no power to promise to 
perform seriously immoral acts (e.g. I cannot validly promise to torture you), then mutatis 
mutandis we have no right to promise to perform acts that would involve us in such 
wrongdoing, e.g., my promise to sell you some pliers is subject to the condition that you 
won’t use the pliers to commit torture.19  
If these types of argument are sound, then there is no need to appeal to the values of 
conscience and moral integrity as they add little more to an already plausible non-
consequentialist justification for boycotting. However, we believe that these types of 
arguments are not sound because the complicity-view misses an important feature of the 
permission to boycott.   
Consumers who are motivated to boycott wrong-doing firms rarely boycott all firms that 
act wrongfully. Rather, boycotters most commonly choose to boycott firms who are 
engaged in wrongful acts that they find particularly objectionable, given their broader 
commitments. Just as the fashionista may discriminate in their purchasing choices 
against certain types of outfit given their broader aesthetic preferences, so too do 
conscientious consumers boycott certain types of wrong-doing that they find particularly 
troubling. The complicity justification cannot easily explain (or condone) this selectivity. 
It is those wrongs that prick the conscience of the consumer that are often most ripe for 
boycotting, not all wrongs. 
Complicity-theorists can respond to this selectivity worry by suggesting that we should 
only concern ourselves with serious forms of moral wrongdoing, rather than moral 
wrongdoing simpliciter, and/or that there must be high degrees of complicity in order for 
the right to boycott to bite. These are avenues of argument that we think could profitably 
be pursued.  
However, these responses miss something important about the nature of our permission 
to boycott. It seems true that there are certain forms of serious moral wrongdoing that 
plausibly implicate the integrity of any human being (e.g. modern slavery). Such cases 
provide us with strong reasons to boycott regardless of our stand on the issue in question. 
It is part of what it means to be a responsible moral agent to object to such practices. The 
                                                 
19 The claim that seriously immoral promises are invalid was famously made by J.E.J. Altham in J.E.J. Altham,  
‘Wicked Promises’ in I. Hacking (ed) Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985). For the contrary view, see John R. Searle, Rationality in Action 
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 193-200; David Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 245-249. 
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justification for boycott in such cases is agent-neutral. But it also seems true that there is 
a range of wrongful practices which are less serious, but which particular agents still have 
special reasons to object to because of stances they have taken in the past against similar 
practices. For example, if I am a vegetarian because I believe breeding animals for human 
consumption is cruel, then those same reasons give me strong reasons to boycott 
cosmetics firms that engage in animal testing. Although every agent may have a reason to 
worry about animal cruelty, the vegetarian has additional reasons of integrity to boycott. 
These additional reasons flow from the relationship between the wrong in question and 
the vegetarian’s prior moral commitments. Given their similarity, the vegetarian would 
suffer from a form of moral inconsistency if they acted in one case but not the other. In 
contrast with the slavery case, the reasons granted by the vegetarian’s need to avoid 
moral inconsistency are agent-relative. 
The complicity justification struggles to capture this important distinction between 
agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons to boycott on its own. Without further 
argument, the complicity justification cannot account for the latter set of reasons. Yet 
these reasons are important. Descriptively, it seems an important part of the practice of 
boycotting that boycotts take place not only in cases where there is serious moral 
wrongdoing, but also where firms engage in practices that strike at values that particular 
agents or consumers hold dear. Normatively, these additional reasons might tip the 
balance in favour of a right to boycott in the presence of prior moral commitment (such 
as breach of contract).  These considerations explain why it seems to be a mistake to 
ignore these agent-relative reasons in our account of permissibility. This is what gives 
moral integrity the edge as an explanation of the practice of boycotting.  
By moral integrity, we mean to invoke a particular conception of personal integrity, which 
emphasizes not only the importance that agents attach to their own beliefs, values, 
commitments, projects, and sense of self,20 but also the fact that these are genuinely held 
moral beliefs, values, commitments, and so on, which it is reasonable for the agent to 
endorse.21 This relatively thick conception of integrity captures what we think is at stake 
in boycotting cases.  
We possess moral integrity when we meet our reasonably-held demands of conscience. 
This has a personal aspect of judging and meeting the obligations that flow from our 
                                                 
20 J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity 
Press, 1973), pp. 116-117. 
21 Our conception of integrity then is thicker than the standard integrated self, identity and clean hands 
conceptions. For discussion, see Cheshire Calhoun, ‘Standing for Something’, The Journal of Philosophy 92, 
5 (1995): 235-260; Susan Mendus, Politics and Morality (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), pp 16-27. Our view is 
closer to and influenced by Ronald Dworkin’s theory of integrity or ‘principled consistency’ as a conception 
of law. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), ch. 6.  
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commitments.22 This also has a social aspect by imposing duties on others to recognise 
the importance of principled consistency in our lives, and to avoid imposing burdens 
which make it too difficult to live up to these standards.23  
Moral integrity is a source of great value. Living up to our moral commitments, regardless 
of whether doing so maximally benefits ourselves or others, is what marks us out as the 
particular individuals we are. We show ourselves to be good friends, partners, colleagues, 
etc., when we fulfil the duties associated with those roles. Acting in this way, though often 
difficult, leaves us better equipped to navigate a moral landscape marked by plural, 
competing values.24 Acting in this way is also important for our sense of self-respect, for 
many of the virtues of personal autonomy, and for satisfactory moral development. 
Finally, living up to these standards can reduce the psychological harms of 
disappointment, frustration, and dissonance caused by failing to live up to our full range 
of moral demands and pressures.25  
Principled or conscientious consumers have the capacity to adopt a self-reflective stance 
toward their own moral deliberations. When we value ourselves as sources of normative 
practical reasoning, we reflectively endorse these reasons as consistent with our 
preferences and self-conception. This valuing judgement is the source of our sense of 
moral integrity and the obligations generated by our commitments establish our 
demands of conscience.26 When consumers act with integrity, they recognise and 
privilege the moral demands of their commitments in their purchasing decisions. These 
demands include avoiding complicity in particular forms of moral wrongdoing that 
conflict with central aspects of the consumer’s moral personality. Avoiding this type of 
complicity, even when a boycott fails to change the behaviour of firms, is a weighty reason 
for the principled consumer.27  
                                                 
22 Calhoun op. cit., p. 249; Greg Scherkoske, ‘Integrity and Moral Danger’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40, 
3 (2010): 335-58, at pp. 352-8. 
23 Calhoun op. cit., pp. 252-60. 
24 Kimberley Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), pp. 62-71. Conflicts between these roles and duties creates scope for reasonable 
disagreement about wrongdoing. Provided that one’s commitments are sincere and based on genuine 
values and true moral principles, the fact of reasonable disagreement does not compromise one’s right to 
stage a principled boycott. It does though mean that political and legal institutions are required to 
adjudicate disagreements. We return to this point below.   
25 David Luban, ‘Integrity: Its Causes and Cures’, Fordham Law Review 72, 2 (2003): 279-310. 
26 Brownlee op. cit., pp. 62-6; Calhoun op. cit., p. 258; Dworkin op. cit. 2000, p. 270. 
27 In defending the moral permission to boycott on these grounds, we agree with Claudia Mills when she 
argues that integrity-based justifications of the practice provide consumers with a reason to avoid ‘dirtying 
their hands’ by becoming an accomplice to corporate wrongdoing through their purchasing decisions.  Mills 
argues that this justification conflicts with outcome-based justifications of boycotting because the latter 
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Moral integrity plays an important role in justifying boycotts in circumstances where the 
orthodox assumptions do not hold, such as cases of breach of contract. In such cases, the 
promissory obligation establishes a strong impersonal moral reason to perform the 
contract, even when performance conflicts with one’s own personal commitments. For 
example, it is implausible that one could justify breaching a contract on the grounds that 
it has come to light that a firm is engaged in practices that compromise one’s fundamental 
aesthetic commitments. That sort of reason lacks the necessary weight to defeat the 
promissory obligation to perform.  
However, where the reason against performance is itself a moral reason (e.g. it comes to 
light that the firm is engaged in exploitative labour practices), a conflict of duties may 
arise.28 In the face of that conflict, it seems legitimate that the promisor be granted a right 
or permission to breach when performance of the contract threatens to compromise her 
moral integrity. We suggest that this is true when the firm’s actions threaten to make her 
complicit in serious moral wrongdoing of the kind that every principled moral agent 
should avoid. We also suggest that this is true when the firm’s actions threaten to 
compromise the integrity of her particular moral character given her other moral 
commitments. Both agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons can play a role in generating 
a permission in this type of case.  
The fact that this account of the practice is capable of generating agent-relative 
permissions to boycott is important because, otherwise, the demands of impersonal 
morality seem to require too much from us.29 It allows the right to breach to take 
seriously the importance of principled moral consistency (to self and others),30 and 
allows our actions to express the principles and reasons to which we are committed.31  
The permission granted by this right primarily differs from a consequentialist 
justification as it is not subject to an effectiveness constraint. Therefore, this right permits 
both effective and symbolic boycotts. An integrity-based moral right to boycott will not 
guarantee that we succeed in changing objectionable practices, but in cases like breach of 
contract it will go far in protecting our basic capacity for acting with integrity.32  
                                                 
requires consumers to get involved precisely in this way in the hope of ending the firm’s objectionable 
behaviour. Mills op. cit., p. 141-5. 
28 In the same way that it makes all the difference when politicians lie or betray their promises that they do 
so for the common good rather than for personal gain. Mendus op. cit., p 51.  
29 Ibid., pp. 33-34. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for helping us to clarify this point.  
30 Calhoun op. cit., p. 254; Mendus op. cit.  
31 Cf Mendus op. cit., p. 50.  
32 Cf Brownlee op. cit., p. 79, who uses considerations of conscience to defend a general moral right to 
integrity. She argues that this right ‘…protects a justified moral claim founded on a sufficiently weighty 
interest in being able to fulfil our moral responsibilities even when competing considerations make 
fulfilling those responsibilities morally problematic.’ Ibid., p. 127.  
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This moral right completes our deontological justification of boycotting. Commercial 
boycotting is best understood as a choice not to trade based on conscience. We have 
suggested that the moral permission to boycott derives from a conflict between the moral 
integrity of the consumer and the wrongdoing of the firm. Consequentialist and 
complicity justifications of the practice emphasise the latter while ignoring the former. 
This emphasis leads them to encounter the problems identified above. In contrast, 
integrity-based justifications emphasise the need to balance the two values: when 
consumers boycott, they are attempting to avoid complicity in, and take a principled 
stand against, a form of wrongdoing that is incompatible with their own moral identities.  
What remains to be investigated is the strength of this moral right. As we argued at the 
outset, in liberal market economies the right to boycott seems guaranteed by the freedom 
of contract principle. Consumers usually don’t owe their consumption to firms, and they 
are free not to purchase whatever goods and services they like. They might refuse to buy 
on grounds of conscience, but equally for many other reasons, such as price, quality, 
aesthetic preference, brand loyalty and so on. They have then freedom from contract. The 
more morally difficult cases are those where freedom to contract has already been 
exercised. A consumer has bought a good or service, but facts come to light which suggest 
that the firm has been involved in morally objectionable practices that conflict with the 
consumer’s basic moral commitments. We have argued in this section that the consumer 
should have a moral right to boycott in these circumstances, but how strong should this 
right be, and in particular, does it justify a legal right to breach?  
 
Boycotting in the Absence of Liberty: A Defence of Conscientious Breach of Contract 
A Legal Right to Breach?  
Suppose that a consumer enters into a contract with a firm for a particular product or 
service, and facts subsequently come to light which show that the firm is or has been 
actively engaged in a form of illegality or moral wrongdoing which is incompatible with 
that consumer’s moral profile. We want to exclude cases where at the time of contract 
formation the firm promised not to engage in these forms of wrongdoing, deceived or 
misled the consumer about its engagement in these activities, or where the contract itself 
requires performance of a wrongful or illegal act. Such cases would be dealt with by 
traditional contract law doctrines, such as expectation damages, misrepresentation, or 
illegality. Our question is whether, in the absence of these traditional factors, are there 
grounds for the consumer to refuse performance when facts come to light after contract 
formation implicating the firm in serious malpractice or moral wrongdoing which strikes 
at the consumer’s conscience? No such defence is currently recognised in Anglo-
American law.33  
                                                 
33 The illegality doctrine in contract law is broad, but its focus is matters of public rather than private 
interest. See the recent decision of the English Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 (SC) [120]. 
Public policy concerns have been used to justify a defence for organisers of a boycott to the tort of procuring 
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A defence is necessary because the consumer has a pro tanto obligation in these 
circumstances to perform her contractual obligation, due to her (unvitiated and perfectly 
valid) agreement to the contract. The question is whether the consumer’s innocent 
entanglement in the firm’s wrongdoing, which conflicts with the consumer’s moral 
integrity, justifies the consumer’s breach of her promissory duty?34 As we have argued, it 
does; the consumer is permitted to breach in these circumstances. 
Is this though ‘merely’ a moral right to breach, or should it go further and justify the 
creation of a legal right; should the state recognise or enforce the right to boycott as a 
legal defence in the context at least of breach of contract? This has important practical 
consequences, relating for example to whether the consumer has a duty to compensate 
the firm for breach. There are two main reasons why we argue that the state should 
recognise a legal right to boycott: First, it encourages dialogue between citizens and the 
state about how best to interpret the law; and, second, it fosters the conditions for the 
expression of moral agency among citizens.  
First, the existence of such a defence opens up a channel for citizens to challenge settled 
interpretations of the law, with a view to prompting the state through its courts to revise 
those understandings, and improve its protection and recognition of moral and political 
rights.35 An analogy can be made here to rights to conscientious objection in the criminal 
law. Ronald Dworkin, discussing the example of those who resisted the draft during the 
Vietnam War, argued that recognising such rights has several virtues for a legal system.36 
First, it creates opportunities for the policy implications of exceptions to rules to be 
tested. So, before a final determination is made on whether to allow a defence, the courts 
can make a judgment in the light of experience of conscientious objection about what the 
likely effects of creating an exception might be. Secondly, it helps courts to reach correct 
decisions, because in these cases resistance is backed with arguments which bring alive 
to the courts the matters of principle at stake. And finally, it shows to the courts the 
strength of feeling against a particular law.  
This view of conscientious objection sees law as interactive. As Gerald Postema has 
argued, law is not a ‘top-down’ practice: ‘Judicial interpretive activity, while prominent 
                                                 
a breach of contract. See Brimelow v Casson [1924] 1 Ch 302 (defence granted to an actors’ union which 
induced theatres to break existing contracts with the manager of a female chorus group who was 
underpaying his staff, with the result that members of the group resorted to prostitution to supplement 
their incomes). As this tort is now considered a form of accessory liability (see Lord Hoffmann’s speech in 
OBG Ltd v Allan and others [2007] UKHL 21 [5]), there may be scope for the evolution of such a defence in 
the case of a principal’s liability for breach. This possibility though has not yet been tested. Thank you to 
Ben McFarlane for bringing this line of authority to our attention.     
34 We invoke a conception of defences here argued for by John Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected 
Essays in the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), ch. 4.  
35 This feature distinguishes the permission from one of mere conscientious refusal. John Rawls, A Theory 
of Justice (Harvard: Belknap Press, 1971), pp. 368-71. 
36 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977), pp. 213-214. 
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and powerful, is nevertheless dependent in many ways on the interpretive activity of 
other, professional and lay, participants in legal practice’.37 In our view, the right to 
boycott for breach of contract is the private law equivalent of the more general and 
familiar public law right to conscientious objection. The rationale for conscientious 
objection embraced by republican conceptions of the rule of law, such as Dworkin’s, 
extends, we believe, to justifying the creation of a boycott defence in contract.  
This role goes beyond so-called ‘proto-legislative’ conceptions of boycotting, such as that 
recently defended by Waheed Hussain. On this view, boycotting is an ‘…informal prologue 
to formal democratic lawmaking’.38 Boycotters are permitted to boycott when the formal 
democratic process has not already addressed the issue in question and when their 
actions introduce rules that they believe the full citizen body should adopt on full 
consideration of the facts.39 In contrast, our claim is that because boycotting is linked to 
notions of moral integrity, it opens up the possibility of principled dialogue between 
citizens and the state through its courts about what the law actually is (ex ante the breach 
of contract) rather than what as a matter of policy it should be (ex post the breach).40 Our 
view is that boycotting should prompt judicial re-interpretation of the law, as well as 
legislation.  
Our second and related reason for advocating a defence of boycott for breach of contract 
is that the absence of such a defence might impose an intolerable burden on moral agents 
seeking to achieve principled consistency in their own lives while simultaneously 
complying with legal requirements. The tension would arise out of the fact that whilst 
morally speaking they would be permitted to breach these agreements, the law would 
hold them to their transactions. This brings their practical identities and moral 
commitments into direct conflict with their duty to obey the law. Although the law should 
not seek to enforce morality, we follow Seana Shiffrin here in thinking that it should not 
make the expression of moral agency unduly burdensome.41 
This need to respect the conditions of moral agency underpins the importance of 
principled dialogue discussed above between citizens and the state when it comes to 
                                                 
37 Gerald J. Postema, ‘“Protestant” Interpretation and Social Practices’, Law and Philosophy 6, 3 (1987): 283-
319, at p. 310. 
38 Hussain op. cit., p. 125. 
39Ibid., pp. 126-8. 
40 We rely here on Dworkin’s distinction between arguments of principle and policy and his claim that it is 
the role of courts to make determinations of rights specifically on the basis of matters of principle. We 
presuppose here a non-positivist account of law which does not contain ‘gaps’, i.e., areas where there is no 
law on a particular issue, and where a judge is required to exercise a legally unconstrained discretion.  
Dworkin op. cit. 1977, ch. 2.  
41 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, ‘The Divergence of Contract and Promise’, Harvard Law Review 120, 3 (2007): 
708-753. See also Robert C. Hughes, ‘Responsive Government and Duties of Conscience’, Jurisprudence 5, 2 
(2014): 244-64, at pp. 256-8. 
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making determinations about legal rights and duties. Therefore, we conclude that 
common notions of moral integrity and complicity can ground, as a matter of law, an 
agent-relative permission to boycott that retains political and moral weight in situations 
where market actors would otherwise lack the liberty to abstain from trade, such as 
where the boycott requires breach of contract. 
 
Should Law and Morality Diverge?   
An objection might be made that while there is a moral right to boycott, it should not be 
given legal force because of what Shiffrin calls ‘distinctively legal normative arguments’, 
which count against enforcement. These are moral arguments ‘…whose range is 
specifically tailored to the special, normatively salient properties of law and its 
appropriate content and shape’.42 If such reasons exist, and are used by the courts to deny 
rights to boycott, it might be that divergence between law and morality can be justified 
in these cases.  
There are three specifically legal reasons to worry about enforcing the right to boycott in 
the context of breach of contract: First, there is a potential risk that this right will ‘open 
the floodgates’ to defences for breach, unsettling commercial transactions and the legal 
certainty that they rely on. Second, there is a potential risk of fraud as some consumers 
might exploit the boycott defence as a means of escaping unfavourable bargains. Finally, 
there is a potential risk that such a defence will create serious epistemic problems for 
courts, who will have to undertake the difficult task of determining whether issues of 
integrity are actually at stake in particular cases.  
We believe these are genuine concerns, but that they can be dealt with by attaching 
conditions to the availability of a boycott defence. The danger that such a defence will 
open the floodgates can be resolved by stipulating that it will not suffice for the consumer 
to show that they believe that the firm is engaged in wrongdoing, but rather they must 
show that they have reasonable grounds for holding that belief.  
There are two elements to making such a claim. First, the consumer will need to show not 
only that the principle at stake is one that she sincerely believes to be a plausible moral 
principle; rather, it has to actually be a plausible moral principle, i.e., she must have 
reasonable grounds for believing it. This requirement rules out cases where the 
consumer holds clearly unjust moral views.  
Many cases though won’t be so simple. Imagine that the consumer discovers that the firm 
has been using sweatshops to manufacture its goods and that this strikes against her 
deeply held moral convictions about preventing exploitation. However, the firm argues 
that their employment practices are justified because they create employment 
opportunities in poor countries. Such cases will of course involve the courts in making 
difficult moral judgments, and indeed we don’t deny that there is scope for reasonable 
                                                 
42 Shiffrin op. cit. 2007, p. 733. 
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disagreement here. However, courts as the ultimate arbiters of our civil and political 
rights routinely make and are indeed required to make these sorts of assessments. For 
example, the law of tort weighs up principles of freedom and corrective justice when 
settling on rules to determine what is owed by those who cause accidents. The law of 
contract weighs up promissory principles and principles that prevent coercion or deceit 
in determining when a promisor is entitled to a defence of duress or misrepresentation. 
These are all difficult and contested judgments, but nevertheless it is the duty of courts 
to make them.43 A boycott defence for breach of contract then requires nothing more of 
the courts than what they are already required to do.  
Secondly, the consumer must show not only that plausible moral principles are at stake 
in the case, but that the firm has indeed violated these. For example, if the allegation is 
that the firm is using sweatshops, the consumer will need to provide evidence (perhaps 
from journalists, NGOs, charities and so forth) which shows this is true on the balance of 
probabilities (the civil standard of proof).  
These moral and evidential hurdles involved in showing the reasonableness of the 
consumer’s belief in the firm’s moral wrongdoing help to alleviate the worry that a 
boycott defence will open the floodgates to litigation. However, they may give rise to the 
opposite worry of too little litigation. They highlight the risks associated with litigation 
and its attendant costs. It may be that only the rich will have the resources to defend these 
claims, and that indeed raises the sorts of concerns discussed at the outset about equality 
of political impact and fair value of equal liberties. These are valid worries, but it seems 
to us that these are concerns about access to justice generally and don’t specifically relate 
to the issue of whether there should be a right to boycott. So, to the extent that these are 
genuine concerns, they are an argument not against having a right to boycott, but rather 
for increased access to justice. We would not think these sorts of arguments entail that 
there should be no right to conscientious objection in criminal law cases, and it’s unclear 
it should be any different for boycott, which we suggest is a similar species of right.  
The danger that consumers will exploit the boycott defence by using it to escape 
unfavourable bargains is mitigated because it is not sufficient for the consumer to show 
that they had reasons to boycott. Those guiding reasons must also be the consumer’s 
explanatory reasons for action, i.e., they motivated her to act.44 Furthermore, as with 
certain cases of contractual duress, the courts could adopt a robust causal test for 
determining when the consumer’s motivations justify the defence, i.e., it would not be 
sufficient to show that the demands of conscience were ‘a’ reason, or even a ‘but for’ 
reason for breach, but rather they might have to satisfy the higher threshold of being a 
                                                 
43 See further Ronald Dworkin, ‘The Forum of Principle’, New York University Law Review 56 (1981): 469-
518. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for helping us to clarify this objection.  
44 On the distinction between guiding and explanatory reasons, see Gardner op. cit., p. 98. 
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‘decisive or clinching’ reason.45 The difference with the ‘but for’ test is that it would be 
insufficient to argue that in the absence of the threat to the consumer’s moral integrity, 
the consumer would on the balance of probabilities have performed the contract. Rather, 
the consumer would have to meet the more stringent standard of showing that because 
of moral integrity even in the absence of other reasons not to perform, she would not on 
the balance of probabilities have performed.   
Finally, the epistemic difficulties associated with determining whether issues of moral 
integrity are actually at stake can be dealt with by using objective evidence as a proxy for 
subjective intentions. This objective test for determining intentions is familiar to the 
courts as the standard device used for contract interpretation. So, it will not be enough 
for a consumer to say that performance of the contract compromises her integrity, but 
rather she will have to adduce objective evidence to prove her commitment to the 
principles violated by the firm’s practices (e.g. this might include her membership of 
certain charities or NGOs aimed at preventing the sorts of injustices at stake).   
The concerns expressed here about opening floodgates, the potential for fraud, and 
epistemic hurdles for the courts, are not unique to the boycott defence. They apply in the 
context of other contract law defences, such as mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue 
influence, and more. The courts have a long history of proving themselves adept at 
dealing with these specifically legal arguments through a combination of the methods 
described above. Provided that courts pursue similar strategies in the context of 
boycotting, we believe these sorts of arguments do not justify law diverging from 
morality in this context.   
On balance then we think there is a case for a boycott defence in circumstances of breach 
of contract. We should clarify though that we do not mean to deny that the consumer may 
have responsibilities to take other – perhaps more effective – action alongside exercising 
her moral and legal right to boycott. She may have a duty to protest in other ways, by for 
example joining a march, writing letters to her MP, giving money to an NGO which 
exposes such malpractices, and so on. These broader obligations and responsibilities may 
be implications of the consumer’s moral commitments, which give rise to the boycott 
defence. But they may also be consequences of the fact that the consumer who justifiably 
breaches her contract with a firm nevertheless owes the firm certain residual obligations 
on account of having made a valid promise. For example, the duty to seek respectful 
relations between herself and the firm by taking action to bring the relevant injustice to 
light (through boycott, letter writing, attending marches and so on), with a view to 
persuading the firm on moral rather than merely prudential or financial grounds to 
change its practices. These are duties that the principled consumer owes to the firm, 
which are not discharged by the fact that the consumer availed herself of her right to 
boycott. That does not though – as Seana Shiffrin has argued in the context of promissory 
                                                 
45 Huyton SA v Peter Cremer [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 620 (Com Ct) 636, and see Dimskal Shipping Co SA v ITWF 
(The Evia Luck) (No 2) [1992] 2 AC 152 (HL) 165. 
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duress – mean that the firm has a right (moral or legal) to expect the performance of these 
duties. The firm’s moral wrongdoing precludes them from having such a right; the 
consumer is bound in conscience only.46  
 
Conclusion 
Boycotting is a widespread practice with important transnational implications. We have 
argued that at least in certain contexts, such as breach of contract, it stands in need of 
justification. We have shown that consequentialist and complicity arguments cannot 
justify the practice as both arguments fail to adequately explain important features of 
permissible boycotting.   
Rather, the superior justification is deontological and based on the constitutive value of 
moral integrity and both the agent-neutral and agent-relative demands to avoid 
complicity in moral wrongdoing that integrity creates. These are moral concerns that 
courts have a duty to recognise in the context of breach of contract claims, by enforcing 
in law the moral right to boycott. Legal enforcement provides an opportunity for the state 
to engage in a principled dialogue with consumers about what the law is, and avoids 
putting moral agents in the intolerable position of having to choose between their 
conscience and their duty to obey the law.  
Legal reasons for objecting to the defence, such as the danger of unsettling commercial 
transactions, preventing fraud and epistemic difficulties faced by the courts, are all 
legitimate concerns. They can however be dealt with by attaching conditions to the 
availability of the boycott defence. Similar conditions apply in the context of other more 
traditional contract law defences, such as duress, undue influence, mistake, and so forth. 
In that context, we suggest that a boycott defence is an increasingly necessary, principled, 
and workable restriction on freedom of contract in modern liberal economies.  
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46 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2014), ch. 2.  
